The role of the Military Public Prosecutor's Office in conducting non-prosecution agreements: Interpreting Article 79 of the Military Criminal Procedure Code in light of the accusatory system

DOI: https://zenodo.org/records/20669474

Abstract

This article examines the applicability of the Non-Prosecution Agreement (ANPP) within the Federal Military Justice (JMU), focusing on the actions of the Military Public Prosecutor's Office (MPM) and its suitability within the adversarial system. Inserted into the Code of Criminal Procedure (CPP) by Law 13.964/2019, the ANPP was not expressly replicated in the Military Code of Criminal Procedure (CPPM). This created a normative vacuum, sparking discussions about the institute's (in)applicability in the JMU and leading to practical interpretive divergences. The study elaborates on the thesis that legislation grants the Public Prosecutor's Office the prerogative to execute the ANPP, leaving subsequent ratification to the Judiciary. It further demonstrates that the non-filing of charges under Art. 79 of the CPPM, due to ongoing ANPP negotiations, does not constitute a violation of functional duty. To this end, the paper describes the agreement and its application in the JMU, analyzes the compatibility of Art. 79 with the Constitution, and proposes an adequate procedure for the ANPP in the military context. It also suggests measures for the Senior Administration of the MPM for institutional strengthening and the standardization of practices. The research, using a normative and institutional approach, focuses on the MPM's activity, employing the deductive method. Starting from general principles, a specific solution is constructed, presenting a procedural and regulatory answer. The final objective is to offer a practical and operational contribution to prosecutorial action, highlighting the prerogatives in conducting the ANPP and promoting the advancement of negotiated criminal justice within the Brazilian legal system, from a military perspective.